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Abstract 
Many systems, composed of hardware, software, and combinations thereof, function in 
sequential stages: each subsystem (stage) must operate correctly in order for the next to be 
challenged. All stages, including the interfaces between major function subsystems, are 
subject to design defects, which if actuated cause that stage, and hence that test, to fail. We 
provide models that evaluate the “testing as learning and improving” paradigm: the models 
describe the effect of end-to-end or linked-stage testing, and defect identification and 
removal, on field or delivered-system reliability. A major concern is the evaluation of 
operating characteristics of such test designs as the “first run of Y total system successes (e.g. 
3)” stopping rule. The models include Bayesian formulations in which the unknown number 
of defects in each subsystem at any stage during testing is a random variable with known 
distribution. The models and methods of this paper provide test planners with the answers to 
“what if’ questions concerning the likely fbture(s) of entire systems placed on test. They can 
be used to address test resource requirements. 
1. Introduction and Model Formulation 
This paper provides mathematical models of reliability growth by design defect or 
failure-mode identification and removal in system reliability testing and management, for 
instance during military Test and Evaluation (see Seglie, 1998). The models demonstrate 
how testing can promote early learning about, and rectification of, system defects in 
design, manufacturing, and operations. In the military and elsewhere, such testing should, 
and does, begin with engineering-level Developmental Testing (DT), initially of 
subsystems, and terminates with end-to-end Operational Testing (OT). At present, 
attempts are being made to compress and combine DT and OT so as to shorten 
acquisition time and decrease its expense. The models proposed are intended to provide 
insight to modem test planners. Software that exercises the models is available from the 
authors. 
The model structure to be studied is the following. A system, S, is made up of S 
(S> 1) subsystems or stages, each of which must function on demand, in sequence, for 
perfect operation; failure of any subsystem, especially to interact with another subsystem 
(interaction can also be viewed as a stage), means total system failure. Demands for 
subsystem, or inter-subsystem, function occur in order, stagewise; s = 1 , 2, . . ., S. If a 
demand at an intermediate stage/subsystem, s, succeeds, i.e. any faults do not activate, a 
demand is placed on stagehbsystem s + 1; if all such demands succeed, the entire system 
operates successfully on that particular test or usage occasion (it may not again if 
remaining faults activate). That is, a system following current design and realization must 
function “end-to-end” in order to operate reliably - “suitably” in military parlance. This 
“success” does not mean that the particular system mission is necessarily overall 
successful or “effective” (a reliable weapon may not accomplish its mission: it may miss, 
or hit a wrong target). Such may also be, in part, reliability issues, but attributable to 
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C4ISR errors. Note, however, that the design defect removals we aim for may include 
those in basic functionality (“effectiveness”) such as accuracy and lethality. 
To perform a system-level operational test of 8, suitable test conditions are first 
established. It is desirable to quantify those conditions (weather and other environmental 
effects, pre-test transport and setup stress, target properties, etc.). This can be done by 
incorporating explanatory variables to represent between-test variations. For recent 
related modeling see Bogdonavicius and Nikulin (2000). Under given conditions let each 
subsystem possess a certain (random, or at least unknown) nmber of failure modes (or 
defects), ds, for subsystem s, s S S .  These modes become active (cause failure) with 
probability 8, if a demand is received at that stage; otherwise are inactive or survive with 
probability 1 - 8, = $. In order for the sth subsystem to experience test, and hence 
possibly reveal a failure mode, all previous i E (1 , 2, . . ., s - 1) subsystems, and their 
interconnection and transition actions, must survive, and hence transmit, demands. If a 
failure mode in a subsystem is activated (causes failure), the design or execution may 
well be modified. Here it is optimistically assumed that the failure mode is removed, and 
thus “reliability growth” occws, but this simplicity may not hold: new failure modes may 
actually be introduced, and bedrock non-removable failure modes will remain. These 
realities are ignored for simplicity in the present report, so the results are likely to be 
optimistic. We also ignore the detrimental effects of system aging (one-shot items 
eventually age on the shelf). We again emphasize that in operational field testing it is 
often the inter-subsystem interactions that exhibit surprising new failure modes which 
must be discovered by suitable testing. Our model can cover such situations by simply 
defining some stages as “interaction subsystems”. 
Here, testing the complete system (e.g. a missile or an information system) requires 
that “early” (s = 1,2, . . .) subsystems survive so that “late” (s = . . . S-1, S) subsystems can 
experience demand, and hence literally be subjected to test. Failures of early subsystems 
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protect later subsystems from test; this effect must be overcome in order for the entire 
system to be tested. Engineering-level or developmental tests (DT) of the individual 
component subsystems will be, or have been, carried out, but these cannot be completely 
trusted to identi@ all failure modes that may appear in actual operation when the entire 
system is assembled and tested, much less in the field. In the ideas we explore are related 
to, but not the same as classical burn-in; whereby early testing removes weak components 
from an existing population; see Block and Savits (1997) for a nice review, and also Lynn 
and Singpurwalla (1997). Our problem emphasizes design burn-in: systems are tested and 
the design improved before a population of manufactured and fielded items is created. 
Members of that population can possibly then experience classical burn-in before 
fielding, but the need should be reduced if the design has already been improved. 
2. Operationally Relevant Questions 
Given preliminary values of the parameters, inferred fi-om engineering design and 
experience with analogous subsystems and systems, it is operationally meaningful to 
address such questions as these prior to starting expensive field testing: 
(a) After a given number of system tests, what is the (approximate) probability that 
the system will operate satisfactorily (not fail) when released to the field or delivered to a 
user? 
(b) How many tests are likely to be required to achieve the first (or jth) end-to-end 
success? 
(c) How many tests are required to achieve r ( e g  3, or 5) consecutive end-to-end test 
successes, or, in statistical parlance, a (first) run ofr;  a possible test stopping rule that is 
attractive because of its simplicity and intuitive evidence of system success? 
(d) Suppose testing is stopped after T tests (possibly fixed, or random governed by a 
stopping rule such as “first occurrence of a run of Y (e.g. Y = 3, 5 ,  . . . whatever) successful 
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reliability tests of entire system”), after which no further design modifications are 
contemplated. What are the failure characteristics of the system if fielded: e.g. what is the 
Stage1 Stage2 
operationaZ/JieZd probability of system (reliability) success? For a previous account of 
this measure of system success under “reliability growth” see Fries and Maillart (1996). 
Stage S 
What is the probability that the system completes a mission that requires at least M 
successes if M +  R systems are allocated? What is the mean, and variability, of the 
number of tests required? 
3. Models for Discovery of Hidden, or Sequentially-Evident, Design Defects 
A system is composed of a number, S ,  of subsystems each of which contains an 
uncertain number of failure modes (design defects). When a design defect is activated 
during a test, the system fails at that subsystem, and that particular test terminates. Figure 
1 illustrates the configuration, and outcomes. 
v 
(End Test Unsuccessfully at Stage s) 
Figure 1 
Let 
Ds(t) = number of design defects present in Stage s after t tests; 
Ds(0) = number of design defects present initially in Stage s before test (or at 
least before operational, end-to-end, testing). At this stage the 
distribution of Ds(0) may be treated as a Bayes prior, or as an expression 
of inherent variability; a Bayes prior can describe hyperparameters. 
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Stages are request-activated strictly serially, starting with Stage 1 and ending with 
Stage S. If any stage fails to respond, the following stage is not demandedrequest- 
activated and the system triaVtest fails. The Stage s request activation can only occur if all 
previous stages, i = 1,2, . . ., s-1 respond to their request activations. (This does not imply 
that stages that successfklly respond to their request activations are free of defects - they 
may well randomly activate and cause failures on later trials, or even on a mission after 
system release.) Repeated testing tends to remove defects, but there will be little reward 
from testing long enough to eliminate defects that are unlikely to activate in the field. 
4. Model: Stage-wise (Binomial) Failures, One-at-a-Time Removable 
Invoke the stage-wise failure model, and allow only one activated design defect to be 
identified and removed per test (no new design defects are introduced). If more than one 
failure mode or defect is activated on a test we assume that only one of these can be 
identified and removed; the others can activate again. 
There follow several hctional-equation modeling systems that respond to questions 
posed earlier. 
4.1 Expected Probability of System Field Success After a Fixed Number, t, of Tests 
Let Di(0) be the initial number of defects in stage i, i = 1, . . ., S. Assume that some 
defect in stage i is revealed during a test with probability pi(di);  &(di)= l-pi(di)  
where di is the number of defects in stage i, assumed L 1. A special case is &(di) = OF, 
but allowance for random (extra) variability in 8 (e.g. as a Beta random variable) is 
natural to reflect within-stage variability beyond the simple binomial. Note that this is 
viewed as representing physical mixtures; it is not necessarily a Bayesian prior. A defect 
revealed in stage i causes the system to fail without revealing any defects in later stages; 
these are hidden for that test. Each test reveals at most one identifiable defect or fault. 
Such a discovered defect is assumed removed with certainty (with probability equal to 
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one) by present assumption (if it is successhlly removed with probability p then we may 
replace the probability a defect is discovered and removed, e.g. 1 - 8 by (1 - 9 p  and 
proceed). Let Di(t) be the number of defects remaining in stage i after t tests. Let Q i  be the 
probability a remaining defect in stage i does not activate whle the system is put in use in 
the field during one mission. (Desirably, Qi z or > &, the probability a test does not 
reveal a defect.) Note: for initial example, but not throughout, activation of some design 
fault or defect is Binomial: Fi(di) = 1 -OF . It is possible to represent extra-Binomial 
stage-to-stage variability by mixing within stages to provide extra-binomial variability: 
E[ OF]  ; see Appendix A. 
Define 
p(d* , . . . ds , f) = P(D1 ( t )  = dl , . . . , Ds(t) = ds } , (4.1) 
the joint probability of the number of defects present in each stage after t tests. The 
following forward equation (Markov chain) can be established by conditioning: 
p(d1, ..., ds , t  +1) = 
, i=l i=l 
\ 
9 No design defects 
removed on test t One design defect removed on test t (e.g. from stagej,j=l,2 ,..., S) 
Note: the term in the last product, ( )* = 1 if i = 1.  
The recursion is initialized with 
1 if&(0)=dl, ..., D s ( ~ ) = d s  
0 otherwise 
P ( d l , . .  . ,ds ,o) = 
The probability of system survival in the field after t tests is 
7 
(4.3) 
Or, more generally, with field probabilities of sunival allowed to differ from those of the 
test and experience stage-wise mixing, 
d: - . .*is j=1 
The following examples are based on simpIe Binomial stasewise failures: 
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Figure 2 
The graph suggests that reliability growth in a several-stage serial system is not likely to 
have the characteristic of classical one-stage reliability growth models of Duane and later 
authors, e.g. Fries (1993). There are ample physical reasons for this behavior. They also 
imply that more rapid and complete defect elimination and hence “reliability growth” 
occurs if the last-reached system stages are apt to fail sooner than the earlier-reached 
stages. The reason is that need to re-test the last stages forces more tests of the earlier 
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because of the end-to-end success requirement. It is unlikely that a designer, or tester, can 
ever directly influence such a distribution of defects, but there may be implications for 
variations in the intensity of component-level testing: one might tolerate a few more 
faults in later stages, so that earlier stages will be subjected to more operational end-to- 
end tests. 
4.2 Probability of Mission Success in the Field if Testing Stops After First Run of Y 
Consecutive Successful Tests 
Suppose the system test is stopped when there are Y (r 2 1, e.g. 3) successful end-to- 
end tests in a row (a “first run of J’). A test with this stopping rule ensures that all stages 
are tested at least Y times. The probability of system survival after completion of the test 
can be computed using a backward equation as follows. Let pr(dl, .. ., ds) be the 
conditional probability of system mission survival in the field after the test, given that the 
initial numbers of defects are Dl(0) = dl, . . ., DS(0) = ds. Use the previous stagewise 
survival probabilities, & (di) to write 
Run of r successful tests 
occurs before any test failures 
(4.6) . .  
pr(dI,---,di -1,-..7dS) 
, 
Start over after a failure at stage i before run of r successful tests achieved 
Note: ( )* = 1 if i =  1 
The recursion starts with pr(O, . . ., 0) = 1, and thus builds up to any desired initial load of 
design defects. 
&(di) = E [ e * ]  
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Here the field survival probability is assumed equal to the field test system survival 
probability: o ( d )  = q(d) .  
Note: the above equation permits quick numerical determination of the mean or 
unconditional probability of field success. Simulations show that there can be substantial 
difference between the mean and the actual probability of success, depending on fault 
survival. The following forward equation can be used to calculate the distribution of the 
probability of system survival after the test. 
Let Tr(a , ,  ..., a,) be the probability that there are ai7 i = 1, . . ., S defects remaining 
sometime during the test. The probabilities y r  (a, 7 . .  . ,a,) can be obtained recursively as 
S 
= C T , ( a l ,  ..., a, +I,  ..., as 
s=l 
fi i=l 
with initial condition Tr(d, . . . ,ds) = 1 where dj is the initial number of defects in stage i, 
i = 1, .. ., S; note ( )*= 1 i f s  = 1. 
The probability of having ai remaining defects in stage i, i = 1 , . . ., S after completion 
of the test is 
These probabilities can be used to obtain the distribution of the probability of field 
survival after the test is completed. 
10 
Numerical results with Bernoufli-triaIs Stagewise Variability. 
In the example whose resuits are displayed in Fi=gure 3 G(di )  =a(d, )  =Qf . Note 
that Fi0we 3 displays considerable robustness of mean mission survlivd outcome to 
number of design defects and activation probabilities: often the mission survival 
probability exceeds 0.8-0.9. Note that in the case S, =0.75, =0.25, @=0.75, 
6'' = 0.25, the probability of mission survival after testing increases sli&tly as the initial 
number of defects in each stage increases. In this case the larger test activation 
probabilities 8, = 1 - 6'1 = 0.75 for stages 2 and 4 result in more testin3 of stages 1 and 3. 
Consequently, the design defects in stages 1 and 3 are more apt to be discovered and 


















Prob of system survival after run of 3 successful tests 
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Figure 3 
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4.3 Mean Time to Stop After Reaching First Run of r Consecutive Successful Tests 
This is a measure of the time cost of a test program that is run-terminated. Let 
Yr(d1, dz, ..., ds) be the conditional expected time (number of tests) until a run of Y 
successes first occurs, given that there are initially d i  defects in stage i. Here is a 
backward equation for this performance measure. 
- 
r-run after r tests: 
initial r-run 
Probability no-initial run of r i=l 
\ / 
9 
Expected number of tests to achieve r-run, given failure to achieve initial r-run 
Y ~ ~~~ 
Probability first activation after nSr tests, 
given no run of r 
Note: ( )* = 1 if j =  0 
An initial condition is 
Y d O , O ,  . . ., 0) = Y (4.10) 
Numerical results with stagewise over-variability. 
In the examples of Figures 4, 6 ,  and 8 we compare the probability of mission success 
for several cases when (a) the stagewise probabilities @ are taken as invariable (“fixed”), 
Bernoulli trials probabilities vs. (b) the stagewise probabilities are themselves variable, 
independently for each stage and test. This extra-Binomial variability can conveniently be 
characterized by a diffuse beta distribution with mean equal to the fixed values of (a). The 
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variability in (b) represents some aspects of uncontrollable between-test, and between- 
test-stage conditions; see Appendix A. In each case that has been investigated the 
probability of field success is higher for (a), “fixed” or controlled probabilities, than for 
(b), the corresponding stage-wise mixed probability. Practical considerations suggest that 
(b) may be the more qualitatively realistic, because of the likelihood of extra 
uncontrollable variations in the field. Some such are likely to be roughly common to all 
stages; this is analyzed in Appendix B. 
From Figures 4,6, and 8 it is striking that the order of the defect survival probability 
occurrence (which may be practically difficult to control at the developmental testing 
stage) can be influential at the final field survival probability level. Once again, the case 
of Figure 8, 6! 0.75, 0.25, 0.75, 0.25 exhibits improved field response with more defects 
for the Bernoulli-trials case, but not for the over-variability case studied. From Figures 5, 
7, and 9 it is seen that the mean times to achieve a success run of 3 for the different 
parametric cases are remarkubzy similar. These are isolated examples only7 but certainly 
















Prob of field success for a test with stopping rule of 3 successes in a row 
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10 
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Figure 4 
The mixing distribution employed in Fi,we 4 is symmetric, but with high wei$ting near 
0 and 1. Such an environment badly penalizes the tester if there are many (e.s. 5 or more) 
defects in the system initially. 
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The expected times to complete the tests in Fiap-e 5 are remarkabIy sirnilar for these 
cases. 
Prob of field success for a test with stopping rule 3 successes in a row 
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Figure 6 
In Fiawe 6 a somewhat diffuse mixing distribution (Beta) is used for each stage, with 
means located at the “deterministic” levels. Once again, however, the stagewise mixtures 
at stages, independent, and recalculated independently between tests, have a substantia1 
degrading effect on the mean probability of a system’s field success if the system is 

















Mean number of tests to obtain 3 successes in a row 
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Mean number of tests to obtain 3 successes in a row 
50 
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Figure 9 
5. Bayesian Formulations 
A natural approach to the uncertainty concerning the numbers of design defects 
initially present is a Bayesian one in which DOi(0) is treated as a random variable with 
(prior) distribution ni = {& ,d 2 0}  , 1 I i I S. In what follows we shall suppose that the 
random variables Di(O), 1 5 i <  S are independent and that the conditional model for 
failure discovery and removal is as in Section 4 with &(di) the conditional probability of 
subsystem i success, given di defects present. In such a setup, consider the situation 
following t tests of the system. 
Each subsystem i will have its own history Hit = ( X j l ,  xL2, . . ., xir) where each xg takes 
one of three possible values, namely 
(subsystem i was not subjected to scrutiny during testj because of the 
failure of an earlier subsystem) = Og; 
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{subsystem i was subjected to scrutiny during testj a d  operated 
successfully} = So; and 
{subsystem i was subjected to scrutiny during testj and a defect was 
activated and removed) E Fo. 
The first of these cannot occur for subsystem 1. Let ni(t) be the inferred (posterior) 
distribution of Di(t) upon suitable application of Bayes' theorem. Updating is described as 
follows: 
= nt(t), ifxit+l = oit+l; I ~ 1 $ + l ( t ) { l - ~ ( d + 1 ) } ,  ifxit+l = ~ t + 1 .  nh (t + 1) Ot n; ( t )  @ (d), if X ~ ~ + I  = Sit+l; and (5.1) 
In general the posterior Iti@) will depend upon the entire history fit and in particular will 
depend upon the order in which successes and failures occur. 
In this highly complex scenario it seems reasonable to make an initial search for 
simplicity. In particular, we seek conditions under which each Il'(t) depends upon Hit only 
through {Si(t), Fi(t)), where 
t 
S'(t) = Cl(xq = so), 
j=l  
the total number of successful operations of subsystem i during t tests and Fi(t) is 
similarly defined in terms of failures (i.e. defect activations and removals). Expressed 
simply, we require that the numbers of successes and failures to date should be sufficient 
statistics for each subsystem. Work by Benkherouf and Bather (1988) in the context of oil 
exploration implies that this requirement forces a conditional model of the form 
which is the Binomial case of Section (4.1). Until indicated otherwise we suppose that 
(5.2) holds. 
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Further, Glazebrook (1993) introduced a family of prior distributions which are 
conjugate for this problem. Let Di(0)- n'(0) = rI(Ai, 6, b), 1 5 il S, where the 
probability mass function (p.m.f.) for n(A, 6, 4 is given by 
where &(A, 6, @ is a normalizing constant. The parameter space associated with this 
family is (0 < A -= 1,O < 6< 1, #= 0) u (A > 0, 0 < 6< 1, # > O}. The first parameter A 
may be interpreted as an overall rate of finding failures while #may be thought of as a 
rate of depletion of defects in a subsystem under failure, and subsequent defect removal. 
Parameter 6 is always assigned the value of the probability in the conditional Binomial 
model in (5.2). Special cases of this model are 
n(n, e, 0) = E(a, 9; n(a, 6, 1) = H(A, 9, (5.4) 
the Euler and Heine distributions with parameters (a, 9 respectively. These are discussed 
by Benkherouf, Glazebrook, and Owen (1992). The reader should note that, for regions of 
its parameter space, the Euler distribution may approach either a Poisson or a geometric 
distribution. Thus the prior family (5.3) is quite versatile. 
With the prior n(Ai, 6, qj,) in (5.3) and the conditional model (5.2), the posterior 
distribution for Di(t) is given (upon operation of (5.1)) by 
From (5.9,  the situation following t tests is such that the overall rates of defect 
detection in subsystems have fallen to the values 
it is reasonable to stop testing when these values are sufficiently small. 
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5.1 Bayes stopping rules 
With the above structures in place we can design stopping rules which are Bayes 
optimal for a range of objectives. In such problems, a major difficulty is presented by the 
computational demands of producing a fully sequential solution via dynamic 
programming. However, in the context of reliability growth in which the number of 
defects is reduced (stochastically) at each test, one-step-look-ahead (myopic) rules should 
perfom well. See, for example, Benkherouf and Bather (1988), Gittins (1989) and Manor 
and Kress (1997) for examples of this phenomenon. Suppose that we wish to maximize 
an objective 
where T is the number of tests performed, c is a (suitably standardized) cost per test and 
N (1, for successhl field deployment following T tests, 
QT = 10, otherwise. 
In (5.7) the expectation is taken with respect to the prior distributions (summarized by IT). 
A key quantity required for the development of a solution to (5.7) is the predictive 
probability of successful field deployment Q(S, I?) at a point in which the data from 
testing are summarized by sufficient statistics S ,  F = { (Si, Fj), 1 I i I S} . Utilizing the 
above independence assumptions, 
S 
Q(S,F)  = n a (si 8) (5 -8)  
i=l 
where Qi(Si, Fj) is the predictive probability of successful field deployment of subsystem i 
with sufficient statistics (Sj, Fi), 1 I i I S. Taking ni(0) = n(Aj, 6, b), conditional model 
(5.2) and o.(d)  = 84, d 2 0 , l  I i 5 S, we deduce from (5.5) that 
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We write E{Q(S,  F)} for the expected predictive probability of successful field 
deployment following one additional test, starting from ( S ,  F). Utilizing (5.5) and (5.8) 
we deduce that 
where in (5.10), 1' is an S-vector whose ith component is one, with zeros elsewhere. A 
Bayes myopic stopping rule for problem (5.7) concludes testing as soon as the gain in 
system reliability from one further test is less than the cost of the test. Formally, the 
associated stopping region is 
[ ( S ,  F); E{Q(S, F)> - Q<s, F) 1 < cl. (5.1 1) 
When c is small (i.e. the cost of one more test is negligible compared to the utility of 
having a system fully operational in the field) then from (5.9) and (5.10) we can show that 
the stopping region in (5.1 1) may be well approximated by 
i=l J 
(5.12) 
See the comments around (5.6) above. The simple conservative stopping rules above will 
approximate (5.1 1) well for c close to zero. 
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Numerical example 
The stopping rule in (5.12) was applied to a testing problem with 4 stages, 3 defects 
being initially present in each stage. Results may be found in Table 1. Four different sets 
of theta values were considered, namely, R1): 0.75, 0.75, 0.75, 0.75, R2): 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 
0.5, R3): 0.25, 0.25, 0.75, 0.75, and R4): 0.75, 0.75, 0.25, 0.25. The prior distributions 
used to determine the stopping rules were taken to be Euler in all cases. For these 
distributions a value of A is required. We explored two different approaches to malung 
this choice. In approach 1 we set A to be 1 - 83, thus guaranteeing that the unconditional 
initial subsystem failure probability in the Bayesian model was equal to the (actual) initial 
failure probability with three defectives. Under this approach, we used priors 
E(0.578,0.75), E(0.875, O S ) ,  and E(0.984,0.25) as appropriate. These A choices are 
denoted iy.1) in the table. Under approach 2, for given B we chose 2 such that the mean 
of the E(A, 9 distribution was 3. Under this approach, we used priors E(0.500,0.75), 
E(0.672, O S ) ,  and E(0.734,0.25) with the A choices denoted Re2) in the table. Testing 
continued until an appropriate version of the stopping criterion in (5.12) was met with c 
set equal to 0.1, 0.06, 0.04, 0.02, 0.01. The smaller the value of c, the more conservative 
is the resulting test. Each case (cell of the table) was run 3,000 times. The results are 
given by the unbracketed values in each cell of the table, which are (reading from top to 
bottom): 
(1) actual mean probability of field success at end of testing; 
(2) mean predictive probability of field success under the Bayesian model at end of 
testing; 
(3) mean number of tests. 
The bracketed values are the corresponding standard errors. 
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Table 1 
Probability of field success and mean number of tests with a Bayes myopic stopping rule 
\ 
0.515 (0.004) 
(@l)All)) 0.475 (0.001) 
1 1.569 (0.025) 
0.437 (0.003) 
(@1),412)) 0.467 (0.001) 
10.562 (0.024) 
0.865 (0.004) 
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We note the following fi-om the numerical results. The larger A-values obtained from 
approach 1 usually result in slightly longer tests than those resulting fi-om the smaller 
values associated with approach 2. The final predictive estimate of field success tends to 
be slightly conservative (i.e. an underestimate) on the average for approach 1, but tends to 
be slightly optimistic (i.e. an overestimate) for approach 2. The latter is not surprising 
since approach 2 adopts priors which imply an overestimate of the initial probability of 
field success. That said, the results give encouraging evidence of operating characteristics 
which are robust to the choice of lambda, especially so when c is small. One particular 
point to note is that for case 8(2), the characteristics of the Bayes rules when c = 0.04 are 
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very comparable to those obtained from the "3 successes in a row" stopping rule. The 
reader is referred to Figures 4 and 5 above. 
5.2 Stagewise ovewariability 
Appendix A and Section 4 argue for a modification of (5.2) by the representation of 
extra-Binomial stage-to-stage variability in the conditional model. The proposal is to 
replace (5.2) by 
&(d) = E(@)  with B - Gi, 1 I i I S . (5.13) 
Recall that the Binomial model (5.2) was required for the simple stnrctures above based 
upon sufficient statistics ( S ,  F). We conclude that, with the more general (5.13), the 
posterior distribution n'(t) will depend upon the entire history fit = {xily XQ, . . ., Xit}, 
excepting only those entries xg equal to 0,. Put another way, ll'(t) will depend upon the 
complete sequence of successes and failures to date. It emerges that, while we lost 
simplicity of structure by generalizing in this way we make important advances in 
applicability of the model and in addition develop a rationale for run tests as good 
stopping criteria. 
We focus first on a single subsystem and, for the present, drop subsystem identifier i. 
The subsystem has D(0) defects initially with associated (prior) distribution ll = {I&, 
d 2 0). The conditional model is q(d), with p"(d) = 1 - q(d) ,  d 2 0. We consider a 
sequence o f t  tests during which the subsystem is subject to scrutiny upon 9 + zP)+'oj , 
occasions of which 9 result in failure (and defect removal) and z?''oj result in system 
/=I 
/=I 
success. More precisely, 01 is the number of successes before the first subsystem failure, 
oqZl-1 is the number of successes following the last (dh) subsystem failure and q, 2 < j  5 
9, is the number of successes between failures (j - 1) and j .  We write { 01, e, .. ., oe~, 
p} for this data configuration. 
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By repeated application of (5.1), the posterior probability of d subsystem defects 
remaining following these t tests is given by 
nd (t> n d / 0 ~ , 0 2  ,..., b p + ~ , v )  
Further simplification results in the special case 
which results fkom taking 8- q0,1]  in (5.13). See (A.3) in Appendix A. The posterior 
distribution in (5.14) then becomes 
We now perform some calculations which shed light upon the nature of updating and 
reliability growth in this context. A key focus of the analysis will concern how the 
posterior probability of system survival in the field varies with the data. When we discuss 
the full system we shall need to restore the subsystem identifier i. Consider now two 
subsystem data configurations { 01, 0 2 ,  . . ., 0e1, p} = (0, p} and {oi ,& ,. . . , o ~ + I  ,p} = 
w, pl- 
Definition. Data configuration {G, p} dominates configuration { ~ ' , p }  if r. k=l (Tk  I 
The above definition is describing a partial ordering between data configurations in 
which the dominating sequence has the same (total) number of successes and failures, but 
has the failures earlier. Note that in the models based on the Binomial conditional model 
in (5.2), the posterior distributions for the two sequences would be identical. This is no 
longer the case. 
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We now generalize the material around (5.8) by writing Qi(d, pi)} for the predictive 
probability of field success for subsystem i following data (d, pi), 1 5 i 5 S, where 
Q{(o i ,p i ) }=xI I i  dja 9P a.(d), 1 5 i < S .  (5.16) 
d2O 
The corresponding predictive probability for the system as a whole is 
S 
Q{(o ' ,p1 ) , (o2 ,~ ' ) , . . . , (~  s s  ,VI )}= nQ{( oi,pi)}. (5.17) 
In the following result we use IIbi,Pi as a notation shorthand for the (posterior) 
i=l 
distribution for the number of defects in subsystem i following data configuration (oi, pi), 
1 < i 5 S .  
Theorem. For any choices of prior distribution ni and conditional model (5.13) for 
which 6 (1) = EG~ (0) c 1 , the following hold: 
(1) If {d, pi} dominates {di, pi} then I I L i , p i  is stochastically smaller than 12k,i,Pi ; 
(2) If the sequence {Q(d), d 2 0) is non-decreasing and {d, pi} dominates { d i , p i } ,  1 S 
i 5 S, then 
(3) If the sequence {Q(d), d 2 0} is non-decreasing then Qj{(o', pi)} is non-decreasing in 
each CT;, 1 5 j  5 pi + 1, 1 5 i 5 S, as is Q{(d, p'), (02, q?), ..., (o s s  , p )}.
(4) If nb > 0, 1 I i I S, then during a run of Y successes the predictive probability of field 
success approaches 1 at a geometric rate in Y. 
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Proof. 
(1) Le t j  be such that cry and 1 I j 5 qi. Consider configuration {di + lj" - l'} . Direct 
application of (5.14) shows that 
(5.18) 
for some constant K.( CJ t i ,  qi , j )  . But since distribution Gi has support contained in [0,1] 
it is straightforward to show that { EG,. (@ + I ) / & ,  ( @), d 2 0) is a non-decreasing 
sequence. It follows immediately fiom (5.18) that the distribution l I ~ t i + l j + I - ~ j  4i  is smaller 
than 1 3 L r i , p i  in the likelihood ratio ordering and hence also in the stochastic ordering. 
However, we can move from (di, pi) to dominating configuration (oi, pi) by means of a 
sequence of transitions of the form ( g i , q i )  + (Gi  + 1'" - l j , q i )  for some j. This, 
together with the transitivity of stochastic ordering yields (1). 
(2) is a simple consequence of (1). 
The proof of (3) involves straightforward application of (5.14) and is omitted. 
(4) A of Y successes means that each subsystem data configuration is (r,O). By (5.14) 
we have that 
where inequality (5.19) utilizes the decreasing nature of the sequence { E G ~  (8' ), d 2 0} = 
{&(d), d 2 0} . From (5.19) we deduce that that predictive probability of field success for 
the whole system is 
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(1-n;) 
Q{(co)}=fiQ{(~,O)} i=l &I- i=l n', {6Z(l)}r 
s (1-n',) 
2 1 - C  
i= 1 n', 
and the result is a straightforward consequence. 
The conclusions of the above result are strongly suggestive that runs tests, while not 
being Bayes optimal in the formal sense above, should nevertheless provide simple and 
effective designs for a range of reasonable cost criteria. We discuss prior analyses of such 
tests later. 
5.3 Bayes confidence regions 
A natural focus for inference following testing is the unknown parameter p(system 
survival in the field). Suppose that, as in (4.4), this takes the value n a . ( d i )  when the 
(unknown) number of defectives remaining in subsystem i following testing is di, 1 I i I 
S 
i=l 
S. The case a(di) = Qdi , 1 I i I S, and Q is a constant is particujarly simple and we 
consider this fist. In this model the probability of field survival is Q='  . 
C di 
Let fii be the posterior distribution for the number of defective modes remaining in 
subsystem i following testing. The 3, 1 I i I S, yield fi, the posterior distribution for 
the number of defective modes remaining in the entire system following testing. For 
given a > 0, let D(a) be given by 
[ n=O 
then { 1, Q, . . ., @@)} is a lOO(1- a)% Bayes confidence region for the parameter of 
interest. 
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s -  
1=1 
In general, we need to work with an ordering of the quantities { n. Q.(di) ,dl 2 0, 
d2 2 0, . . ., ds 2 01. Call the (ordered) members of the collection 1 = 0 0  2 a 2 02 2.. .
with 
and 
Fl = ded, C{fifiL} i=l 
for the corresponding posterior probability. For given a > 0, let Y( a) be given by 
then { 1, a , (& ,.. . , is a loo( 1 - a)% Bayes confidence region for p(system survival 
in the field). 
5.4 Prior analysis of test designs 
As in Section 4, proposed test designs may be assessed by means of a prior analysis 
(i.e. in advance of the tests) focusing on such key measures as the meanp(system survival 
in the field) following the test, the mean time to the conclusion of testing, and the 
probability that the field probability of success is greater than 1 - a. From a Bayesian 
viewpoint, the appropriate measures will be expectations taken with respect to the prior 
distributions l?, 1 I i 5 S. Suppose that the p,.(dl, d2, . . ., ds) are available for di 1 0, 1 5 
i 5 S, by the computations described in Section 4.2. Then 
(5.20) 
is the appropriate measure of say, the meanp(system survival in the field) following a 
“run of J’ test. The summation in (5.20) is over all di 2 0, 1 I i 5 S. 
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In the case of very diffuse priors, implementation of (5.20) may be computationally 
expensive. Simpler alternatives exist for some of the specially structured models 
described at the beginning of this section. Consider, for example, a situation in which 
n' E &'(A', fl), 1 I i S S, and we have the conditional Binomial model of (5.2). From (5.9) 
we conclude that, since 4 = 0 for this choice of prior, we have 
for the unconditional probability of subsystem i success initially. When we further 
assume that the p(system survival in the field) takes the conditional form nf 6F , we r=l 
then have for the mean probability of system field success 
Run of r successful tests o&rs before any test failures 
Start over after a failure'gt stage i during test tsr 
and G(0,O ,..., 0) = 1. 
Numerical example. 
Table 2 reports results from a numerical study of the probability of system field 
success after a test, which ends with Y successes in a row. The system consists of 4 stages. 
Given d, defects in stage s, s = 1, . . ., 4, the conditional probability that the system passes 
4 
one test is n q , ( d , )  where 
s=l 
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with 8, having a beta distribution. Two cases of randomized 8, are considered. In case A, 
each theta is drawn from a uniform distribution independently for each stage and test. In 
case By 0, is drawn from a beta distribution with mean b, / (a, + b,) for 
[(.9, .I) for s = 1 , 
4 
In all but three cases, the field probability of system success is n 0.8d5(') where d, (Y) 
s=l 
is the number of defects remaining in stage s after the test is complete. The initial 
numbers of defects in each stage are independently drawn from Poisson distributions with 
the means noted in the table. There are 25 replications for each case. Displayed are the 
mean of the mean probability of system field success, the means of the probabilities that 
the probability system field success after the test is greater than or equal to 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 
and 0.95, and the mean of the mean number of tests required to obtain a run of Y 
successes. The standard errors of the means appear in parentheses underneath the means. 
The distribution of the $, s = 1 , ..., 4 has a great effect on the probability of successful 
field performance after the test. In case By the defects in stage 4 are less likely to reveal 
themselves during the test. Thus for case By the probability of field success after a test 
until a run of 3 successes is smaller than for the case of uniformly distributed @, 
s = 1, ..., 4. 
The initial mean number of defects in each stage also affects the probability of field 
success. The case with 5 defects in stage 4 has the smallest mean of the mean probability 
of field success after a test. The mean of the mean probabilities of field success after a 
test until there is a run of 7 successes in a row is 0.66 for this case. 
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The mean of the mean number of tests needed to obtain a run of I- successes for the 
cases displayed is somewhat insensitive to the pattern of the initial mean number of 
defects in each stage and the probability of defect discovery during test. 
In all but three of the cases the probability of a defect in a stage causing failure during 
use in the field is 0.8, which is different than these probabilities during testing. In the 
three cases in which the probability of field success is the same as that in testing, the 
mean probabilities of field success are higher. It is important to design tests so that they 
represent field conditions as closely as possible. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we consider models of overall system testing to achieve reliability 
growth by design defect identification and removal. This is sometimes referred to as Test- 
and-Fix (TAF). We consider a system with S stages in sequence; if a test reveals a defect 
in stage s, the later stages s + 1, . . ., S are not subjected to the test. We assume that at most 
one defect is removed per test. 
A sequential test plan that ensures that all the stages will be tested at least Y times is to 
test until there is a run of r consecutive system successes. A system success means that all 
the stages operate successfully during the test, which implies that the propensities to fail 
of remaining design defects is likely to be small. Results obtained for a Bayesian model 
formulation suggest that, while not being Bayes optimal in a formal sense, a runs test 
provides a simple and effective test stopping rule for a range of reasonable cost criteria. 
We propose analytical procedures to calculate the mean probability of field system 
survival after successful completion of a runs test, the distribution of the probability of 
system field survival after a successful runs test, and the mean number of individual 
system tests required to achieve a run of Y successes, and hence test termination. 
Numerical studies indicate that the probability of system field success after a runs test can 
be quite sensitive to the probabilities that a test activates faults in each of the stages. 
However, the mean number of tests required to obtain a run of Y successful tests appears 
to be relatively insensitive to these activation probabilities. This suggests that it is 
important to design operational tests so that the test mimics field operation of the system 
as closely as possible. 
The procedures of this paper have been programmed in Visual Basic and Excel. The 
software is available from PAJ. Exercise of such software can provide guidance to test 
planners and analysts. 
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APPENDIX A 
Models for Stage-wise OverExtra Variability 
Generalize the initial binomial stagewise (sub)model by randomizing 9,: replace 9, by 
the random variable 0, and replace 0: by E[Q:‘.] = qs(d,). 
Beta Mixing: 
One reasonable normalization is 




where 9, is the original “deterministic” survival probability, i.e. put q,(l) = 8,. 
The above model simultaneously chooses the same random value for each defect in a 
stage for each visit to the stage, and is independent between stages. For a uniform 
distribution (a, = b, = l), 
1 
1+d, qs(d,) = -
while the corresponding non-mixed version is [ .$, the latter decreasing much more 
rapidly than the former. 
Alternative (“Transform”) Mixing: 
If 





The IG distribution is that of the first-passage time of a Brownian motion with drift. If 
Gamma Mixing: 
The Laplace transform of Y - GamW = shape, p = mean) is 
so if Y = -In@, put t= d to find I 
If p = p =  1 the result equals the uniform (Beta) result, but the Gamma result above is 
more flexible. Normalizing at d = 1, 
If ,8 is an optional tuning parameter, 
,U = p( e-l’p - 1) . 
Stable Law Mixing: 
The Laplace transform of a positive stable law (see Feller, 1966) is 
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where 
Var[ - In el 
, u = E [ - I ~ B ] ,  c =  
P 
(A. 1 1) 
(A. 12) 
the latter being the coefficient of variation of (-ln9. q(d)= e-@ if c -+ 0. The q(d) 
depends on the tuning parameter c. 
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APPENDIX B 
Effects of Test-to-Test Variability 
Let T(d1, d2, . . ., 4, . . ., ds; g) denote the random number of tests to achieve a run of r 
successes for the first time, conditional di defects being initially present in stage i, 
i = 1, . . ., S and on the environmental test-specific random variables these latter are 
assumed positive, independently sampled, and held fixed for each entire test; they thus 
represent test-to-test variability, which can be random (as here), but also deterministic, 
explanatory/regression variables. It can be seen that, conditional on g components, 
T(dl,d2 2 . .  . ,dj ,. . . ,ds; E )  
= n+T(dl,d2,. ..,dj -1 ,... , d s ; g )  for n = 1,2, ..., r ; j  = 1,2, .. ., S, with probability 
The next steps lead to finding the mean time to first attain a run of r test successes, 
thus stopping the overall test. 
First, take the expectation, conditional on _E : 
E[T(dl, d2,. . . , ds; 41 
v ~~ ~~~ 
The conditional (on E) expected time to run of r ,  when there is no run of r in first r 
(run-breaker occurs at Stagej; next test starts over with dj-1 defects in Stage j) 
. .  , , Y 
The conditional expected value of run length, 
when the run occurs on the fmt r tests 
Next, remove the condition on _E, noting that the g' appearing in T(d1, d2, . . ., 4-1, . . ., 
ds; g') refers to future tests, and is here assumed independent on all before; this is a 
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plausible convenience but not a necessity. Taking expectations or removing the 
- &-condition under the iid assumption yields 
where 
and 
The latter expressions can be evaluated in terms of the Laplace transform of the 
&-distribution. Many such transforms of distributions are simple and explicit; see 
Appendix A for examples. 
Let .R(dl, d2, ..., ds; 8 denote the random probability of success after passing a test 
stopped after a run of Y successes, again conditional on test-specific environmental 




R(d1,dz ,.. . , ds; E )  = R(d1, d2 9.. . ,di - 1,. . - , d ~  ;c) 
forn=1,2, ..., r - 1  and i = l , 2 ,  ..., Swithprobability 
failure before run of r ;  start ova 
S S = f i ( a . ( d i ) )  E i ( f )  with probability n(a(di>)"'...n(g(di))'~ 
i=l - i= 1 i=l 
Remove conditions on gX (iid) and sum, using 
' n=I mn of r successful tests before any failures . v 2 
- 1-( MS(dl ,...,&))I 
I-Ms (4 ? . .&) 




start over after failure at some stage (i) before achieve run of r; remove defect, continue 
The following figures display the important role that the presence of environmental 
variability may play in the ability of operational testing to result in the fielding of reliable 
systems. 
Figure B.l displays probabilities of system field success for a system that has been 
tested until there is a run of 5 successes. The testing environmental random variables 
have a gamma distribution with mean 1 and shape parameter 0.5. The field environmental 
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random variable has a gamma distribution with mean 1 and shape parameter beta, which 
has been made widely variable. Note that the smaller beta is, the greater is the probability 
of field system survival. In the present case the testing environment is variable enough to 
produce an effect that is, in the quite disparate field conditions, quite insensitive to the 
distribution of random field effects. 
Probability of system sutvival after completing test until a run of 5 successes in a row 
0=0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Test: Gamma distributed environment mean=I and shape paramete~0.5  
Field: Gamma distributed environment mean=l and shape parameter= beta 
I 
0.1 +-- i i o !  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Initial number of defects in each of 4 stages 
/.field environ beta=0.1 Afield environ beta=0.5 hfield environ beta=l Afield environ beta=5 
Figure B.1 
In contrast to Fi,oure B.l, Fiapre B.2 (respectively B.3) displays probabilities of field 
success (respectively, the number of tests to obtain 5 successes in a row) for a system that 
has again been tested until there is a m of 5 successes in a row. Here the fieild 
environmental random variable has a gamma distribution with mean 1 and shape 
parameter equal to 0.5. The test environment random variables have a gamma distribution 
with mean 1 and variable shape parameter p. The small shape parameter, p = 0.1 , results 
in smaller mean number of tests required but at the price of a smaller probability of field 
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success. The reason: a gamma density function with p= 0.1 has most of its mass close to 
0. Thus, most of the time the probability that a defect is revealed during a test is close to 
0, and the test is over too soon to eliminate many faults. However, since the field 
environment random variable has a shape parameter eqml to 0.5, the defects remaining 
afier the test is completed are likely to be triggered 111 the field. 
Prob of system survival after completing test until run of 5 successes in a row 
Test:Gamma distributed environment mean=1 and shape parameter= beta 
Field: Gamma distribufed environment mean=1 and shape paraineter=O.5 




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
InitiaJ number of defects in each of 4 stages 
Figure B.2 
Variable test environments that allow a disproportionate number of excessively benign 
environments, even though balanced by some that are excessively stringent, can thus 
severely bias the quality of the fielded product. This is only c o m o n  sense, but 
quantified. 
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